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More Crabs, But Still No Barrel 
 
John Henry Schlegel 
 
When one sees an area such as Buffalo that cannot get over dwelling on past, 
now lost, glory the question always arises, "Why?"  What is it that makes looking 
backward so easy and forward so difficult?  
To ask this question is not to belittle Buffalo's past.  Ignore the famous 
architecture of Burnham, Richardson, Sullivan, Wright and Bunschaft.  Ignore the 
hulking mansions of Delaware Avenue, Lincoln, Chapin or Bidwell Parkways or 
Symphony Circle.  Instead, follow most any of the railroad rights-of-way that cut 
up a large swath of the City's East, South and West Sides and look at the hulks, or 
vast empty spaces where the hulks once were, of factories that provided jobs for 
most of the local residents.  Look at the great Catholic churches – St. Adelbert, St. 
Ann, Corpus Christi, Holy Cross, Holy Trinity, St. Pets, St. Stans – that anchored 
these neighborhoods.  Remember that, however presently decrepit, each 
neighborhood once had a bustling commercial strip of butchers, bakers, grocers 
and taverns running through it.  These were vibrant working class neighborhoods 
that over time turned immigrants from disparate villages and towns first into 
Germans, Irish, Italians and Poles and then into hyphenated Americans. 
Or look at the middle and upper-middle class neighborhoods that occupy a 
central northerly trending swath of the city, each almost completely cut off from 
industry since each is largely insulated from railroad rights of way.  Here pleasant, 
though seldom grand, houses filled neighborhoods anchored by smaller, but more 
numerous, disproportionately Protestant churches.  Each of these neighborhoods 
had a commercial strip that bordered it, that defined boundaries in the way that 
rights-of-way defined boundaries elsewhere in the city, and often hosted the public 
transportation to the downtown, white collar jobs that supported these already 
American's way of life. 
There were smaller ethnic neighborhoods too – Czech, Greek, Hungarian, 
Lebanese Macedonian, Romanian, Russian, Serb, Slovak, Ukrainian – each 
anchored to its own church and a small group of purveyors of local delicacies.  
Small Black and Jewish communities could be located as well.  Each thrived, 
though never equally, as circumstances best allowed it to.   
It is easy to look fondly at this past, though its demise had been building at 
least since World War I.  Buffalo was a warm place, if only in its heart.  Some 
would say that the now geographically larger area bearing the same name remains 
so, despite the great scattering of the residents of those ethnic neighborhoods in the 
aftermath of World War II.  But remembered warmth alone is not likely to explain 
the choice relentlessly to look backwards.  To move in the direction of explaining 
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choice, I wish to focus on the process called economic development and the 
planning therefore that is endlessly hoped for, bruited about and doggedly pursued 
in this and other so-called rust belt cities, an activity that seems never to lose its 
attraction, though never to deliver its promise. 
 
The devolution of cries for economic development from "Make this place 
just like it once was," through "Provide jobs that will keep our children here," on to 
"Provide jobs that will keep current adults here," to "Bring us any jobs, good jobs!" 
finally landing on the plaintive "Bring jobs . . . please," is both heartrending and 
evidence of an understandable failure to understand the significance of ghost 
towns.  Jobs don't come because one wants them.  They may come even though 
one doesn't want them.  They do not necessarily come to neighborhoods that need 
them.  They often come to neighborhoods that don't need them.  Economies are 
thus mysterious and unpredictable.  The best one can do is to prepare the ground 
for their arrival and hope.  But such preparation is where theory, and derivatively 
planning, might play a role. 
Now, I am not about to offer a Theory of economic development in the sense 
that Darwin or Einstein or Freud or Marx or Weber is each taken to have had a 
Theory.  I am not a world-historical figure and so have no pretensions about my 
ability to offer such a Theory.  Instead, by theory I simply mean an understanding 
of how some things at a given time, and maybe only a given place, seem to work 
out, ideas that are meant to move thinking along.  Thus, I wish to suggest that in 
Buffalo (and possibly similar places) thinking about and doing economic 
development suffers from a confusion of at least three different objects of 
attention: The poor, the working classes seen as an undifferentiated whole and the 
middle classes.  As I pursue this suggestion I wish also to question whether we 
know what economic development, in contrast to community development, might 
be. 
Start with the easiest of these topics.  It is a mistake to believe that economic 
development will alleviate poverty to a significant extent.  The mixture of social 
deficits, language deficits, and various incapacities, addictions and discriminations 
that abound in poor communities are so complicated that a job, even a better job 
with a "living wage," is unlikely to  "lift," an odd but telling spatial metaphor, 
someone out of poverty.  Which is not to say that money, whether coming through 
grants or wages, will not make the lives of poor people better.  The lack of money 
surely aggravates all of these debilitating conditions.  Economic development may 
make it easier to secure that money without the aid of tax-funded transfer 
payments.  Still, it is important to remember that, contrary to what the economists 
tell us over and over, the economic tide rarely, if ever, raises all boats, much less 
all boats equally.  So, it is a mistake to focus economic development on "solving" 
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the problem of poverty, other than in the sense of making money a bit easier to 
secure, for most of that problem has little to do with the economy. 
Why is it important to remember this?  Well, poor people do vote, even if 
not in large numbers.  And poor people are geographically segregated in this, and 
many other areas of this country, into political entities such the City of Buffalo.  
They thus get their own representatives who need to get re-elected.  To do so they, 
just as much as every other representative, need to deliver services to their 
constituents – help with the bureaucracy and an occasional job within and without 
that bureaucracy.  They also need occasions to call attention to the things that they 
have done for their district.  Generally, this means photo ops, getting one's picture 
on television, or at least in the paper, hopefully standing in the front row, but 
wherever found, always crowded together with, if not submerged by, others who 
are responding to the same imperative. Down a tier is a picture on an official web 
site in business dress with a hard hat and shovel breaking ground or with a big 
scissors opening something or delivering an oversized check to a local 
organization, all the while trying not to look too silly. Still lower is standing behind 
a podium announcing a program.  Lowest is the common press release touting 
some more intangible achievement.  To garner such occasions local representatives 
will try to drive what are commonly treated as if they were economic development 
funds into the area such elected officials represent.   
Securing economic development projects and so campaign publicity 
materials will, however, do nothing or close to nothing for local or even area 
economic development in districts full of the poor.  Poor people need better 
neighborhoods.  They need supermarkets, dry cleaners, drugstores, gas stations, 
restaurants, childcare providers and like privately supplied "public facilities."  
They need safe, secure, airy affordable housing.  They need clean, well lit, and 
well-maintained streets and parks, libraries, good public transportation, good 
sewers, good schools, good police protection and even baskets of flowers in 
summer.  However, these are matters of simple humanity.  Provision of such, or 
even of facilities such as community centers, are probably better seen as 
community development projects and should not be confused with, or undertaken 
as exercises in, economic development.   
Perhaps elected officials know that commercial revitalization efforts, 
housing development, even streets and parks and libraries, are really community 
development projects, but feel that part of getting reelected, especially of 
remaining part of a majority party, requires that some nod, however ineffective, be 
made in the direction of delivering on economic development goals.  And most 
often such projects, under whatever rubric they are undertaken, are an unalloyed 
improvement in poor neighborhoods.  They may also provide good photo ops and 
something to crow about at election time.  However, as an economic development 
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projects they will fail.  Retail sales is a small margin business with remarkably 
large requirement for working capital.  Poor people in poor neighborhoods lack 
such working capital and so are not good candidates for bank loans either.  Thus, 
capital will have to come from other neighborhoods and profits flow back into 
those neighborhoods.  So, commercial revitalization will at best create a few 
service jobs – cashiers, stockers – for local residents.  A few job do not remake a 
poor neighborhood.   
The same is true of residential development and the provision of absolutely 
essential public amenities.  New construction, or even rehabilitation of existing 
structures, may create a few jobs in the local community, but most of the 
employment will benefit other areas because these are places where the people 
who already have the needed skills live.  Indeed, if there were a significant number 
of people in the local area with the needed skills that area would, by definition, not 
be poor.  Some local residents might learn or improve skills on such projects, but 
such growth in skills does not generally lead to founding a flourishing construction 
company, much less a construction materials supply company, the kinds of 
businesses that might actually be part of an economic development effort.  Thus, 
talked of as economic development, commercial revitalization, housing or 
community facility construction will eventually be judged a failure and as such 
make life worse, for failed expectations make life grayer.   
Of course, economic development in an area may mean that some poor 
people will have more money, though of course in some cases that more money 
will be undermined by the gentrification of their neighborhoods.  But seeing that 
poor people have more money, even so-called earned income, as if just living isn't 
an entitlement to some income, will not bring economic development to a poor 
area.  Thus, however attractive as a matter of election and re-election politics, even 
to speak, much less to focus economic development on the problems of poor 
people, especially in the central cities where poor people are accountably, but 
unfortunately, concentrated, is a serious mistake, a category mistake, and an 
embarrassment as such. 
 
Problems of the working classes, by which I mean groups of individuals 
who hold, or wish to hold factory jobs, constructions jobs, transportation jobs and 
service jobs of the kind that in America were, or might have been, unionized in the 
1950's, are quite clearly problems of economic development.  The difficulty with 
such a statement is that it is very difficult to decide whether at this time and in 
places such a Buffalo, economic development is likely to be able to address these 
problems.   
The story of the transformation of the great mass of subsistence farmers, 
native or immigrant, into factory hands and thus into the working class, and the 
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simultaneous fight of middle class artisans determined not to be reduced to 
working class status by the displacement of traditional artesianal methods of 
production with newer factory methods, has often been told and, unfortunately, just 
as often forgotten.  More well known, but less remarked on, is the transformation 
of a part of the working class into the lower-middle class during the 1950's.  This 
transformation, largely through the unionization of great swaths of the factory 
labor force at a time when the United States economy was significantly protected 
from international competition because European industry had been devastated by 
World War II, was accompanied by the creation of the contemporary structure of 
most Northeastern and Midwestern cities.  Lower-middle class incomes allowed 
otherwise working class individuals to migrate from central cities to suburban 
locations, leaving behind an unstable mix of poor people, minorities of various 
economic levels, and upper-middle, and sometimes upper, class families devoted to 
urban living, but dependent on private alternatives to increasingly decrepit public 
schools. 
As ought to be perfectly clear to anyone who has not been living in a 
hermetically sealed environment over the past 35 years, the economy that made 
this transformation possible has disappeared for all practical purposes.  This new 
portion of the middle class initially coped by shifting to a two wage earner model 
of family life.  Such a model is at best precariously stable; the loss of one job 
immediately tosses a family into first, increasing debt, then relative poverty.  
Adding insult to this ever present possibility of devastating injury is the 
transformation of norms in the upper reaches of the middle class, where the 
gradual acceptance of college educated women in the workforce at professional or 
near professional, if not necessarily equal, earning levels, accompanied by a further 
extension of the model of the two wage earner family, has created a great gulf 
between the blue collar middle class and the white collar middle class.   
The decline of mass factory employment and its replacement with a model, 
called advanced manufacturing, closer to that of the traditional machinist's job 
shop, together with the explosion of computerized manufacturing processes, means 
that individuals who are comfortable in securing some post secondary education 
and simultaneously are willing to adjust to irregular, but necessary, changes in 
highly specialized employment that do not generally offer an obvious path for 
advancement are at a premium in the workforce.  This change indirectly, but 
seriously, raises the question of whether the now largely vanished, unionized 
lower-middle class of mass production factory employees sought their factory jobs, 
so-called grunt work, because they were easily available, if deadening, and fit a 
certain macho image of what a "proper" working man might do for a living.  An 
alternative understanding might be that such jobs were at the limit of these 
workers' abilities either intellectually or in terms of a preference for learning and 
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working with one's hands, as opposed to the butts in seats method of education and 
the employment opportunities that flow from such. 
Here I have perhaps indelicately posed what is, of course, not really an 
either/or but partly a cultural question and partly a question of learning style and a 
lot in between as Mike Rose's work has shown.  Unfortunately, it is a question that 
few people engaged in economic development are paying attention to.  The mantra 
of jobs, jobs, jobs that fits a political need when it comes to constituent service and 
so reelection, assumes that jobs are fungible except with respect to salary.  This is 
surely not true.  If the flood of young men and old into factories was mostly a 
question of culture and availability, then perhaps any well paying job will do, 
though one should remember the observation that appears on some of my 
stationery – Culture eats structure for breakfast.  If, however, this flood was a 
result of hard-wired intellectual preferences for learning and working "hands on," 
then there are real problems hidden in the notion that pretty much any economic 
development will bring jobs that will revitalize an area for the benefit of the 
working classes.   
The fabled "New Economy," the name regularly affixed to the results of the 
transformation of economic life in the past few decades, though of course all 
economies were new at some point in time, just as factory-centered manufacturing 
was in 1800, is not friendly toward hands on learning and working.  Look at some 
of the sectors touted as part of that economy.  Advanced manufacturing is not 
hands on; lab bench medical technology is hands on in part, but anything but hands 
on in whole, unless it is washing glassware.  Trucking, a small, retail part of a just 
in time economy, is still pedal to the metal, except when it is computerized 
recordkeeping above the level of the local FedEx delivery person and increasingly 
this is what trucking has become.  Back office/professional support is all butts in 
seats learning and work.  If great swaths of the working classes share a preference 
for hands on learning and working then there are real problems that all the efforts 
in the world directed toward economic development will have trouble dealing with, 
at least as part of the New Economy. 
This mismatch between preferences for learning and working is made more 
serious by another mismatch. The period for returning an investment in capital 
goods is significantly shorter than a working life.  For individual workers, skills do 
not accumulate over the years in the way that invested capital is supposed to 
accumulate.  Redeploying capital after ten to fifteen years is far easier than 
redeploying labor after the same number of years.  In the no more than five-year 
horizon of the private equity crowd, or the three years of the high tech 
entrepreneurs, redeployment of labor is impossible, except for the most flexible of 
recent college grads in low-level administrative jobs and computer jockeys, once 
the love of the venture capital crowd, both of whom share an even shorter attention 
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span.  This is not a matter of old dogs and new tricks, but of sunk costs that have 
created a life that, though fragile to the cosmos, is solid to the humans in question.  
For these humans, the long run of capital recovery may never come.  This is a 
serious political problem. 
From time to time it is suggested that those members of the working class 
who cannot make it as part of the New Economy have a future as part of a remnant 
of the old one, as home maintenance, repair and remodeling craftsmen, or maybe 
as local store owners.  Small businesses of these kinds are likely to be more of a 
curse than a blessing.  First, small businesses require working capital, and while 
the working classes have more of such than the poor, it is unlikely to be true that 
there is enough in most such households.  Even if there were, given the failure 
rates of small businesses, it would be quite foolhardy for a business advisor to 
suggest that putting the available cash into a small business was a good investment.  
Better a CD or no-load mutual fund. 
Second, suggestions such as these ignore the importance of unionized work 
in the transformation of portions of the working class into the middle class.  Small 
businesses, even relatively successful ones, have lumpy income streams.  A middle 
class lifestyle is built on secure income streams, on salary not on wages.  What 
unionized factory employment provided was the reasonable assurance of a regular 
paycheck.  It turned wages into something a good bit like salaries.  With an income 
stream that showed some resemblance to a salary, it was possible that wages could 
be made to support mortgage payments, as well as car payments and boat 
payments and furniture payments and pool payments.  Indeed, as a result of this 
transformation, the working class had available to it the entire panoply of middle 
class schemes for financing capital expenditures that once were relatively merchant 
specific extensions of credit, but that now, except for houses and cars, are mostly 
credit card debt.  A return to lumpy income streams, even with ownership, or 
maybe especially with ownership, is not obviously anything other than an example 
of second best, again foisted on the working classes in the name of acting in their 
best interests. 
The lack of good alternatives to traditional working class jobs is a serious 
problem.  The working classes vote, more than do the poor I might add. They are 
less spatially segregated than the poor, spread over city and suburbs and, when 
searching for inexpensive housing, semi-rural areas as well.  Still, those who 
represent them, just like those who represent the poor, need photo ops. As best as I 
can tell, here representatives in predominantly working class areas favor public 
investment in new and improved parks, boat ramps, and stadia, whether high 
school or vaguely professional, seemingly on the assumption that the children of 
the working classes need healthy outdoor activities and their parents, family 
diversions.  These are, of course, community development projects again spoken of 
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as if they were something else, usually using the only modestly true mantra that 
extensive community amenities attract jobs.  These representatives also regularly 
express significant support for expenditures that improve educational opportunities 
for both children and young adults. 
While educational expenditures surely benefit the working classes, the 
difficulty with public facilities such as those identified above is that they assume 
the existence of surplus income that in many cases, perhaps most, is not there.  
They are investments for parts of the middle classes.  That said, some sympathy 
ought to be offered to the officials in predominantly working class areas needing 
re-election.  It is not clear exactly what public expenditures other than in education 
might possibly help their constituents.  While no such representative would pass up 
the chance to stand proudly in front of a new, or reopened factory in locales that 
need such, those chances a few.  Pictures taken in front of a site where adding a 
new product line means buying one big machine and hiring three additional 
workers are not likely to bring forth pubic acclaim.  Likewise, pictures taken in 
front of a school announcing that school taxes are being raised to lengthen the 
school day so that children get a more complete education, or in front of a 
community college where those taxes would go toward expanded retraining of 
individuals who have lost their jobs, are little better.  None of these events will 
have much political traction even with those individuals for whom factory work 
was mostly a question of culture and availability.  For those who have a hard-wired 
intellectual preference for learning and working "hands on," such events are mostly 
irrelevant, possibly a sham.   
For both groups infrastructure is probably a better investment, though 
seldom does one see a local representative standing proudly in front of a big hole 
in which a new storm drain is being sunk, or in front of a street torn up for 
resurfacing, for while the project is going on the lives of their voters are being 
seriously disrupted.  And brownfields being remediated seldom gather photo ops 
either, being work done on the basis of hope without reason.  And so, again, it is 
not clear that these public economic development activities likely to be undertaken 
are going to be of much use to those for whose lives are intended to be benefited. 
 
What then of the middle classes, often described as the backbone of stable 
government and society?  Two things are odd when considering their problems, 
problems that are more like hangnails than are the problems of the poor and 
working classes.  First, it is at least possible, and I think likely, that the economic 
health of an area can be correlated with the relative size of the middle classes in 
that area.  The larger the middle classes, the healthier the local economy.  Here I 
use "correlation" carefully.  It is very difficult, indeed probably impossible, to 
decide causation – whether it is the existence of relatively large middle classes that 
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causes economic growth or whether economic growth brings about the 
development of relatively large middle classes.  And it may make no difference. 
Second, the middle classes fears about the insecurity of their own position 
and that of their children make them particularly ungracious with respect to 
anything that they believe, however rightly or implausibly, might result in a 
diminution of their comfort – read here home value, or their children's schooling – 
read here college admission prospects.  They will NYMBY to death any change in 
their settled ways, even when they benefited from similar changes at an earlier 
point in time.  As they have the time and other resources that enable them to 
become very politically active at the drop of a hat, they most often get their way in 
matters of public dispute, even when doing so undermines other obvious economic 
interests of their own. 
To work in reverse order, why fear?  The middle classes cover a great range 
of social position in the United States.  Mostly white collar, though surviving 
pockets of well-paid, unionized, blue collar employment still exist, in general the 
middle classes are demarked by the possession of varying amounts of post-
secondary education ranging from the two years now required of new recruits to 
the Buffalo police force, to the post-professional degree residencies/ fellowships 
that have proliferated in medicine and the sciences.  The real hallmark of middle 
class social position is a certain amount of income available for discretionary 
spending – while one can be a spendthrift at any level of income, one has to be at 
least middle class before qualifying as a miser – and yet the absence of significant 
inherited wealth.  The fear is, of course, that somehow the income will run out. 
And this fear is easy to understand.  In the years between 1964 and 1980 (to 
choose arbitrarily, but carefully) the Fifties economy of high wages and secure 
employment collapsed.  It was in that economy, an economy insulated from 
significant international competition and surprisingly free from significant 
technological change, that the middle classes expanded in scope and number.  
Their expansion instantiated the New Deal's understanding of a well-run economy; 
creating such an economy was the point of the New Deal reforms.   
The impact of that economy's collapse can be seen in at least two ways.  
First is the experience, common to individuals born in the Fifties, of being able to 
deliver to their children a relatively lush lifestyle, but recognizing that these 
children are finding it difficult to earn current income equivalent to that of their 
parents at the same point in their careers.  Second is the disappearance of the New 
Deal's basic impulse to spread the society's wealth because there would be, and 
then magically there was, more to go around.  Lyndon Johnson's Great Society 
programs turned into the more middle class environmental programs of the Nixon 
Administration and then sputtered out entirely.  Tax cutting, the withdrawal of 
marginal dollars gathered for the purpose of spreading the wealth and the 
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redirection of those dollars into maintaining social position, became the cause of 
choice.  This cause is best illustrated by one of its earliest manifestations, 
California's Proposition 13, which protected homeowners who had seen the value 
of their investment in housing – the rock bottom middle class asset – soar faster 
than their income and thus found their middle class status threatened because 
increased real estate taxes on the increased value of their property were eating into 
the disposable income that measured their social status.  Afraid, and perhaps 
rightly so given economic trends, the middle classes became defensively stingy.  
They remain so today. 
Fear reduction through economic development is a possible strategy, though 
I doubt a successful one.  Still, the modest correlation between the relative size of 
the middle classes and the economic strength of an area suggests that it might be 
sensible to focus economic development on the presumed needs of the middle 
classes, while keeping in mind that the correlation might in the end turn out to be 
spurious.  If this suggestion were to be followed, one might reason in two ways 
from the somewhat obvious proposition that to be middle class is to be able to 
undertake a significant amount of discretionary spending.   
First, if ever there were a case of demand creating supply this is it.  If there 
is potential money sloshing around, eventually people will come to provide 
occasions for spending it.  And once such opportunities appear in a given locale, 
others will come to try those opportunities, bringing thereafter other suppliers.  
Soon it will be said that the area is a "happenin' place."  While it would be a clear 
mistake to refer to such a process as a virtuous circle, it is not inappropriate to 
notice that this is what has happened on Hertle Avenue once the street and its scape 
were rebuilt.  A middle-middle class neighborhood began to put money into the 
businesses that somehow seemed to be newly attractive and soon suburbanites 
started following.   
Second, consider the possibility that with more places to spend, more people 
might be attracted to an area where there were jobs available. And if there were 
more people who might be willing to come, more people able to create jobs might 
be willing to try to do so.  If more people were to try to create jobs and some 
succeed, then there would be more places to spend discretionary income and so 
more people who might be willing to come bringing more people able to create 
jobs who might be willing to try to do so.  This is closer to a virtuous circle.  It is 
surely the assumption upon which Richard Florida's work on the "Creative Class" 
is built.  It may be the assumption on the basis of which much contemporary 
economic planning proceeds.  However, before trying to apply the forgoing 
analysis of the plausibility of using economic development for the benefit of the 
poor, the working class and the middle classes by looking at planning for economic 
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development in Buffalo, it is probably sensible to review briefly some of the 
region's history.  As always, there is a legacy here that needs to be attended to.   
 
Though the Buffalo region's relative decline began in the Teens, it still had a 
quite vibrant economy up through the Fifties.  That economy was built on mass 
production of goods, primarily related to steel and metalworking, by a large 
unionized work force.  During these years the range of economic possibilities for 
most workers, salaried or hourly, was remarkably narrow.  Their income was 
clustered in a tight middle range and, while it was possible to be very poor or very 
rich, even the spread between these extremes was modest, at least by earlier and 
current standards.  A certain upstairs/downstairs attitude could still be detected in 
the society that fostered a sense of obligation to the less fortunate, though such was 
from time to time disrupted across racial or ethnic lines.  The notion that economic 
development was a general public good still underlay many public programs. 
By the Eighties this world was gone.  Unionized labor in mass production 
industries had for a while been on the ropes, the middle class had splintered as both 
its upper and lower portions expanded while the middle-middle class shrunk in 
relative size, and the extremes between rich and poor had been significantly 
stretched.  Instead of a sense of obligation toward the poor derived from the old 
notion that noblesse comes with oblige, there had developed a multi-faceted 
separation of interests that left the upper half of the income distribution with the 
sense that they did not need the rest of the society and so could ignore them.  Not 
surprisingly then, the assumption that economic development programs were a 
general public good had evaporated. 
What was left behind was an interesting social structure among the region's 
private elite.  Because Buffalo had never had a locally headquartered firm that 
dominated its economy in the way that for example Kodak and Xerox had once 
dominated Rochester's or Carrier, Syracuse's, the region's elite of old families was 
rather broad. Its power was therefore not concentrated.  Rather, it was quite diffuse 
and so hard to marshal.  However, because of inter-marriage, surely a function of 
having only two elite private high schools for Protestants, for all its breadth it was 
also remarkably incestuous.  Interestingly, however, as capital in many of the 
dominant families began to run out, a surprising number of individuals from later 
generations managed to develop smaller businesses, often quite entrepreneurial.  
The public elite appeared to be equally tightly knit, again through inter-marriage, 
though this time founded in the Catholic high school system.  However, it was 
fragmented along ethnic lines, particularly into Irish, Polish and Italian domains.  
For this reason, its power was also difficult to marshal.   
What was left behind at the governmental level was a structure in which 
local governments, especially the cities of Buffalo and Lackawanna, but also the 
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County of Erie, have little financial strength from which to build economic 
redevelopment programs.  Thus, area governments have become extremely risk 
adverse.  They are willing to support only those things that they can see themselves 
profiting from, and so might have supported alone.  The result in the City of 
Buffalo is that what little funds are available are devoted either to projects that can 
be acquiesced in by most of its residents or projects that can be disbursed in 
relatively equal small amounts to differing interests.  In either case, government 
does little in the direction of development beyond veto projects that offend any 
important interest and even then, for most of such projects, its primary activity is 
begging others for money. 
All of this history is made even more complicated by the growth of the 
City's African-American population with its own, more recent differences over 
power and place.  One might begin to understand how such intricate relationships 
play out in struggles over plans for economic development by looking at a quite 
good, if hardly well known, example of so-called "Shelf Art," another of the 
endless parade of unimplemented plans for the revitalization of the area that, 
interestingly, has recently acquired a small amount of political interest.  
 
About 2002, a piece of the University at Buffalo, then called the Institute for 
Local Governance and Regional Growth, joined with several local development 
groups – the Buffalo Niagara Partnership and Buffalo Niagara Enterprise 
(essentially twin representatives of the private sector), the Erie County and 
Amherst Industrial Development Agencies, and the Erie County Executive's office 
– to produce a strategic plan.  In 2004 a draft of that plan was presented to the 
constituent groups.  The draft met with less than universal applause.  Indeed, until 
very recently the project never moved beyond the stage of reviewing a draft.   
Looked at objectively, the document was unremarkable.  Its ideas expressed 
little more than the standard planning notions of the day – adaptation to The New 
Economy and the attempt to attract Creative Class.  Indeed, had it been rejected by 
the constituent groups because of banality one might easily have understood.  
However, this was not the case.  The document was rejected because it was too 
unsettling to some of the participants in the planning process.  This fact alone is 
intriguing. 
The Regional Economic Development Strategy, called "Securing the Future: 
A Distinctive and Compelling Role for the Buffalo Niagara Region in the New 
Economy of the 21st Century," accepted as a given that there had been " a shift 
from an industrial based economy to one founded on information and knowledge," 
brought by "a changing set of economic trends permeating all sectors of the 
economy" that included "Globalization," "Knowledge-Based Economy," "The New 
Nature of Work," "Innovation and Entrepreneurship," and "Quality of Life."  It 
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rejected reliance on "firm-specific subsidies to attract new businesses" as a central 
part of the area's economic development strategy, reasoning that such subsidies 
were ubiquitous throughout the country, and instead suggested a focus on drawing 
new investment by improving the region's "Leadership Infrastructure," "Laws, 
Regulations, Permitting Processes, Tax and Fiscal Policy and Regulatory Climate," 
"Human Resources and Workforce Preparedness," "Physical Conditions (e.g., 
shovel ready sites, sensible municipal and country comprehensive plans)," 
"Community Attributes," "Technological Infrastructure," "Business Foundation 
and Support," and "Quality of Life."  Then it offered the following prescription for 
facilitating growth: 
The regions should embrace innovation and entrepreneurship, 
countering its risk-adverse tendency with support for product 
development and the formation of new businesses.  Also, quality of 
place will be central in attracting a skilled workforce and new 
businesses.  With the region's service costs among the highest in the 
U.S., Buffalo Niagara must look to entrepreneurial governance and 
regional stewardship to build cross-border, collaborative 
relationships that improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
region's public services.  Finally, . . . the region's economic 
development community must begin focusing on providing critical 
resources for the development of clusters of synergistic businesses 
and activities, such as information technology and biomedical 
sciences. 
Thereafter it identified five such clusters that it felt merited support – life sciences, 
back office/professional support, advanced manufacturing, tourism and logistics. 
The detailed sections of the draft expanded on each of these bullets.  One 
theme was repeated with endless variations.  In the new economy the most 
important economic asset is a "workforce with cutting edge knowledge" and that 
workers with such knowledge care a great deal about the quality of life in choosing 
where to work and live as they commit to "life-long learning and skills 
development" in a world where "lifelong employment" is anything but guaranteed.  
These workers, the creative class, "seek out places known for diversity and open-
mindedness.  They look for signs of diversity including people of different ethnic 
groups and races, different ages, different sexual orientation, and alternative 
appearances."  Put differently, "inclusive communities that welcome gays, 
immigrants, artists, and freethinking 'bohemians' are ideal for nurturing creativity 
and innovation."   
Another theme noted the need for governments to become more 
entrepreneurial and for the development of regional stewardship (implicitly 
contrasted with leadership) directed toward the long-term well being of places 
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(implicitly contrasted with short-term political or economic gain.)  Equally strong 
was the emphasis on the need to foster innovation and entrepreneurship by openly 
diversifying membership in local networks as well as sources of capital, and by 
embracing change, especially change directed toward fostering the formation of 
clusters of similar businesses in emerging areas of the economy, particularly those 
related to science and technology. 
 
It is said that the constituent groups objected to the talk about gays and 
bohemians.  In an ethnic Catholic area, still a hotbed of right-to-life activism, I 
suppose this is not wholly surprising, though after years of diversity training 
directed at business generally one might have hoped for better.  What is more 
surprising is that these constituents wanted to hear nothing about the New 
Economy and not because there is little new to it.  As best as I can tell, they wanted 
to hear nothing because even hearing about it was unsettling.  Why would this be 
so?  After all, some of the constituents represented the private sector, a portion of 
the community that one would expect to be most attuned to possibilities for profit, 
and the others represented the public sector, politically charged with responsibility 
for bringing economic growth to the area as a whole. 
Consider first the private sector.  Where planning for economic development 
is concerned, private actors are asked to act as if the public interest were their 
greatest concern.  And to some extent this is exactly what they do, for if profits are 
to be made within the community as a result of a planning process these are going 
to be made because the opportunities opened up are opportunities that the various 
publics will accept, even support, hopefully with tax dollars but at least with 
infrastructure investments, rather than oppose with governmental foot dragging 
and various regulatory barriers.  Still, if the private sector is going support the 
planning process, it is crucial that its representatives be able to see themselves in 
the results hoped for at the end of that process. 
Here, though it is said that the business elite involved in the planning 
process chose the clusters identified in the Regional Plan, I doubt whether many of 
these leaders could see themselves prospering in any of the five targeted areas of 
activity identified in the draft report.  Life science is likely to focus on the 
University of Buffalo and the High Street medical corridor.  However, both parts 
of such a project implicate longstanding intra-community disagreements for they 
implicitly leave out the Catholic Health System and the several small Catholic 
colleges and universities in the area.  The former has all but severed ties to 
University's medical education program and the latter have little claim to mounting 
major research programs in the life sciences.  Equally important, there are few 
existing members of the private sector elite with a significant presence in this 
economic field; foreseeable profit for local elites is dubious. 
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Back office/professional support is in some ways equally problematic.  At 
best such facilities require the construction of a shell and the provision of goods 
and services such as computers and furniture, paper distribution and janitorial 
supplies.  Only the two large local banks have any significant need for such 
services.  Thus, the profits earned in this sector largely will be earned by out of 
town concerns, not by the local business elite.  The situation with respect to 
advanced manufacturing – small batch, heavily computerized, custom made parts – 
is much the same for there is remarkably little of such activity in the area.  And, to 
the extent that growth is likely in this sector, it is as spin-offs from University 
research projects or the work of University graduates, a situation that raises the 
same kind of difficulties as in the case with the life sciences.  Again local elites 
have little likelihood of profiting from growth of this kind. 
Looked at critically, tourism is hardly a big attraction to the business elite 
either.  Great art and great architecture may draw a few people to this area and a 
few more probably will be drawn to the area for sporting events, but Buffalo isn't 
Niagara Falls and as engineering marvels go the Erie Canal is dwarfed by the 
Welland Canal.  There is some money to be made of course, but not much.  That 
leaves logistics, an area where the region is making modest progress in building an 
effective cluster of specialized firms, though one of these has recently been the 
subject of unwelcome press coverage, not the best way to build a reputation in a 
field where reputation counts for something.   
The situation with respect to the public sector is much the same.  As I said 
earlier, public sector elites need to be seen to be doing things, to be delivering to 
(or for, it has never been clear to me which preposition is correct) one's 
constituents.  These two are not necessarily the same. When delivering to, the 
hierarchy of exposure – photo op, web site, podium, press release – quite directly 
leads to public works of a certain kind – buildings, not infrastructure; public policy 
of a certain kind – tax benefits, not administrative simplification; and public 
expenditures of a certain kind – job creation (or at least retention) through program 
creation, not job reduction. 
Delivering for one's constituents can be analyzed in a similar fashion.  The 
question is what kinds of programs can one's constituents envision themselves 
benefiting from.  Well, again tax reduction is always popular, though it is not 
obvious whether it fosters economic development or whether economic 
development makes possible tax reduction.  So, set that strategy aside; instead, 
again consider development based on the list of possible economic clusters set 
forth in the Strategy.  Talking of life sciences jobs conjures up visions of advanced 
science education.  Who with such an education is lacking a job and so can see that 
the expansion of opportunities in this field is likely to be of personal benefit?  Back 
office/professional support jobs are remarkably dependent on advanced, often 
 16 
college, education, at least at some levels, though hardly all.  Here one might get a 
certain amount of constituent interest.  Advanced manufacturing is largely 
dependent on advanced, though not necessarily college, education, but always on 
computer skills of a kind not captured by the word "gaming."  Again, the demand 
for individuals with such skills is such that one has a hard time believing that many 
will see that expansion of such jobs is likely to be of personal benefit.  Tourism 
smells of low wages; never before has it paid, nor will it in the future pay, 
diddlysquat.  Not much political draft there.   That leaves logistics, a business that 
few people even know exists, much less what it means. 
Now none of this should suggest that the Regional Economic Development 
Strategy is a particularly flawed document, though it might be understood to 
confuse planning with dreaming, given that the intellectual underpinnings of the 
activity seem to include the belief that implementation of a plan will follow 
ineluctably from the quality of the ideas identified through the planning process.  If 
it has flaws, they are the flaws common to the genre – a bit of faddishness, a quite 
modest theoretical underpinning and a relative lack of local political savvy.  The 
first is a perfectly ordinary accompaniment to human activity that is indeterminate 
in outcome.  Better to have followed the conventional wisdom in the field than to 
have nothing but a good idea to fall back on when defending an ambiguous or even 
failed, outcome.  The other two are more interesting and also more narrowly 
relevant to the Buffalo region.  I shall turn to them next. 
 
Start with theory in the sense identified at the outset.  The Strategy, like 
most of the economic development literature emphasizes the growth of an 
economy centered in knowledge, sometimes rendered as information.  It makes 
clear that knowledge workers need post-secondary education and need to be 
comfortable updating skills regularly as the demands of knowledge work shifts.  
The implicit message for young people is get a college degree and expect regularly 
to need to acquire classroom updates of existing skills, for that degree will not be 
the ticket to the stable career path that your parents may have had.  A post-college 
degree would be even better, but no less likely to need frequent updating in the 
name of continuing professional education.   
College attendance by children has long marked parents as a part of the 
middle class.  In the Twenties it was expected that boys, at least in the upper-
middle class, would graduate from college; in the middle-middle class some 
attendance was expected.  By the Fifties middle-middle class kids were expect to 
graduate from college – girls as well as boys.  By the turn of the Twenty-First 
Century children whose parents saw themselves in the slice between those two 
fragments of the broad middle class expected that their children would secure some 
post-graduate professional degree.  And, children of lower middle class parents 
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were expected to secure at least an associates degree; even better would be a four 
year degree from a second or third class college, an indication that over time the 
asserted status of the college from which a degree was taken has become the 
significant mark of parental class membership.   
Seen this way, the Strategy is focused on what the middle classes need to do 
to maintain class position.  If one believes that growth in the middle classes will be 
accompanied by an increase in the health of the local economy, this is a sensible 
idea.  Whether that means that what the Strategy suggests for growth is therefore 
sensible is a far different question.  Life sciences possibly, but no middle class was 
ever built on tourism.  Advanced manufacturing may provide support for growth in 
the lower-middle class; back office/professional support may as well, and possibly 
the middle-middle class.  I don't understand logistics enough to offer any opinion.  
Still, there is at least one obvious omission.  The provision of post-secondary 
education itself is a classic engine for the growth of the middle classes; expanding 
such ought to stand-alone as a part of an economic development strategy.  On the 
wishful thinking side, the implicit suggestion that small enterprises are going to 
generate enough middle management jobs to support growth in the middle-middle 
class is somewhat fanciful, though surely less fanciful than the idea, said to have 
been floated by objectors to the Strategy, that one might build a center of 
agribusiness activity around the only remaining miller in the area, a cheese plant, a 
manufacturing complex born of a coffee creamer and a bunch of truck farms. 
If all of this is correct, and I of course think so, paradoxically, effective 
economic development activities may likely benefit those who need them the least.  
Amherst and Orchard Park thrive because their residents can most easily see 
themselves as part of the New Economy and they see themselves as part of the 
New Economy because they have thrived.  Even worse, it is possible that 
supporting their continued thriving is the key to improving the economic health of 
the area, at least if it turns out to be the case that the greater portion of the working 
class sought unionized factory jobs because of culture and availability and not 
because of hard-wired intellectual preferences for learning and working "hands 
on."  This is an anything but optimum state of affairs, politically at least.   
 
So, it is time to return to the question of the political savvy that made it 
difficult for an economic planning strategy to gain traction.  At the time of John F. 
Kennedy's inauguration, Mike Royko, the great Chicago political humorist, sent his 
everyman, Slats Grobnick, precinct captain and loyal Democratic Party foot 
soldier, to the monthly meeting of the precinct captains with the Ward 
Committeeman.  Proudly Slats repeated Kennedy's famous line, "[A]sk not what 
your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country."  The Ward 
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Committeeman, eschewing the possibility of a Ciceronian quotation, replied, 
"What's in it for me?" 
Tom Headrick and I recently argued that effective planning is an exercise in 
getting people to see and be willing to work toward possibilities that they did not 
see before.  If that is not possible, it is probably better to save the trees and other 
hydrocarbons that go into the production of shelf art.  "Buying in," the ugly phrase 
that planners use to describe participants willingness to work for a plan, or at least 
not oppose it, is the key.  In the Buffalo region buying in requires that one be able 
to see oneself profiting from the process described in the plan.  As suggested above 
Buffalo's business elite had no reason to buy-in.  All the plan promised was that, if 
successful, there would be new elites at the table edging over the existing ones.   
The political actors were oddly few – two Industrial Development Agencies 
and Erie County Executive.  Amherst's IDA was an easy buy-in.  After all, the 
understanding of economic development at the root of the Strategy was designed 
for the Town of Amherst's largest population – the middle classes. They at least 
had a real possibility of seeing themselves in the New Economy, however much 
their fear of it may from time to time cause them to fight individual development 
projects.  On the other hand, the Erie County IDA has a grotesquely log-rolled 
structure that essentially mirrors Erie County government in its most fractious 
interest group state.  This zoo is anything but controlled by the Erie County 
Executive.  Its interests are obscure when not simply internally conflicting.  So, it 
is sensible to set both entities aside look at the interests of the County as a 
governmental entity. 
Put straightforwardly, the Strategy offered Erie County the possibility of 
long run benefits, but no short run ones.  If the Strategy worked, growth in the area 
would increase and with it the tax base.  In the mean time, it implied that 
governmental units needed to increase budgets for speeding and possibly slimming 
administrative processes – read reducing the number of government employees, 
never a good idea in either a unionized or patronage employee work force – as well 
as for routine maintenance and services, while limiting capital expenditures to 
infrastructure – streets and sewers and water and lights.  There was not a photo-op 
on the list, except perhaps in the name of tourism, clearly a sop to all of the elected 
officials who had touted such as an engine of economic development for so long.  
Even here there were problems.  Potential tourism projects were hardly uniformly 
distributed across the area.  Some towns and legislators would have none.   
Even the emphasis on services and implicitly education did not bite evenly.  
Because of the structure of state government suburban school districts have their 
own taxing power which when combined with that of their towns is larger than the 
taxing power of the City of Buffalo for itself and its school system, and this on a 
tax base inferior to that of many suburban school districts.  To make the City 
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attractive to families of the middle classes without the income to pay for private 
education in a place where the Catholic school system was crumbling, the City 
would have to improve the school system on the basis of whatever handouts it 
could wangle from the State and with a cumbrous unionized structure that makes 
change difficult and expensive.  In sum, there was no reason for a political buy-in, 
except from some suburban towns that were already doing fine without the 
Strategy.   
If these were not political problems enough, implicit, or maybe not implicit 
enough, there was a trenchant criticism of both the public and private elites in the 
region.  The long list of things that needed improving in the region, especially 
leadership infrastructure, "law, regulations, permitting processes, tax and fiscal 
policy and regulatory climate" and physical conditions suggested that these elites 
had not been doing their jobs.  When combined with a call for more 
"entrepreneurial governance and regional stewardship" it was hard not to see the 
Strategy as a call to replace existing private and public elites with a group less tied 
economically and politically to an economy whose time had long passed and so 
more attuned to current economic conditions.  Elites tend to balk at the suggestion 
it is time to move on.  Historically, in such situations some truculence has been 
noted. 
 
Recognizing the limits of potential buy-ins for an economic development 
strategy based on New Economy ideas brings me full circle back to the question 
with which I began this essay: Why does this region preferentially look backward, 
not forward?  After all, our still relative democracy is best understood as a middle 
class or bourgeois democracy.  Private economic actors are by definition part of 
that democracy and government actors from time to time behave that way as well.  
One might expect that such actors would jump at a strategy based on the interests 
of the middle classes.   
Except that the region has an ossified, inbred private and public culture still 
locked in the Fifties and Sixties when it may have been born, scattered with more 
interests that might block change than there are elected officials.  Grudges often 
survive unto the biblical third or fourth generation, a survival aided and abetted by 
the fragmented local political structure and magnified by the concentration of the 
poor and African-Americans within the City's boundaries, boundaries that can be 
traced back to the mid-Nineteenth Century and that are completely dysfunctional in 
the Twenty-First.   
If one cannot gather together to look forward, back is easy, easier than it 
might seem.  After all, when it comes to economy, law, the major tool of 
government, works best to slow the pace of economic change.  Such is, of course, 
what local elites want so that they may work their existing capital investments 
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down closer to zero and then move to Florida or Arizona, griping as they go about 
the passing of the good times.  Government is also not bad at providing pleasant, 
often necessary civic improvements best understood as community development 
though regularly sold as economic development.  However, these projects 
generally offer little in the way of economic development other than a short-term 
boost in construction industry employment.  In contrast, government does quite 
poorly when it works to accelerate the pace of change, except when shamelessly 
supporting private actors who turn out to have been lucky in the investments they 
have made.  Even worse, where economic development, however that might be 
understood, is concerned, looking forward is difficult since it may well be that the 
primary effective strategies will help the middle classes, those in the community 
that need such help the least, and so provide the least payoff for many elected 
officials and probably are threatening to existing elites.  In such circumstances, it 
may be that looking backward is not the worst possibility.  Still, one might hope 
for something better.  Waiting until the old people die off and the poor and 
working class move away is not likely to be an effective economic development 
strategy.  And we surely need one, for as my title indicates, as a region we have 
plenty of crabs, but still no barrel. 
 
